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The most-noted studies on the impact of microcredit on households are based on a 
survey fielded in Bangladesh in the 1990s. Contradictions among them have 
produced lasting controversy and confusion. Pitt and Khandker (PK, 1998) apply a 
quasi-experimental design to 1991–92 data; they conclude that microcredit raises 
household consumption, especially when lent to women. Khandker (2005) applies 
panel methods using a 1999 resurvey; he concurs and extrapolates to conclude that 
microcredit helps the extremely poor even more than the moderately poor. But using 
simpler estimators than PK, Morduch (1999) finds no impact on the level of 
consumption in the 1991–92 data, even as he questions PK’s identifying 
assumptions. He does find evidence that microcredit reduces consumption volatility. 
Partly because of the sophistication of PK’s Maximum Likelihood estimator, the 
conflicting results were never directly confronted and reconciled. We end the 
impasse. A replication exercise shows that all these studies’ evidence for impact is 
weak. As for PK’s headline results, we obtain opposite signs. But we do not 
conclude that lending to women does harm. Rather, all three studies appear to fail in 
expunging endogeneity. We conclude that for non-experimental methods to retain a 
place in the program evalu-ator’s portfolio, the quality of the claimed natural 
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Abstract: The most-noted studies on the impact of microcredit on households are based on a survey 
fielded in Bangladesh in the 1990s. Contradictions among them have produced lasting controversy and 
confusion. Pitt and Khandker (PK, 1998) apply a quasi-experimental design to 1991–92 data; they con-
clude that microcredit raises household consumption, especially when lent to women. Khandker (2005) 
applies panel methods using a 1999 resurvey; he concurs and extrapolates to conclude that microcredit 
helps the extremely poor even more than the moderately poor. But using simpler estimators than PK, 
Morduch (1999) finds no impact on the level of consumption in the 1991–92 data, even as he questions 
PK’s identifying assumptions. He does find evidence that microcredit reduces consumption volatility. 
Partly because of the sophistication of PK’s Maximum Likelihood estimator, the conflicting results were 
never directly confronted and reconciled. We end the impasse. A replication exercise shows that all 
these studies’ evidence for impact is weak. As for PK’s headline results, we obtain opposite signs. But 
we do not conclude that lending to women does harm. Rather, all three studies appear to fail in expung-
ing endogeneity. We conclude that for non-experimental methods to retain a place in the program evalu-
ator’s portfolio, the quality of the claimed natural experiments must be high and demonstrated.
                                                 
1 We thank Mark Pitt and the Research Committee of the World Bank for assistance with data, Maren Duvendack and Ri-
chard Palmer Jones for scrutiny of our data set construction, and Xavier Giné and Dean Karlan for reviews. Correspondence: 




Microcredit is a phenomenon that needs little introduction. From its beginnings in the late 1970s, the 
idea that access to small loans can help poor families build businesses, increase incomes, and exit pover-
ty has blossomed into a global movement. The movement has captured the public imagination, drawn 
billions of dollars in financing, reached millions of customers, and garnered a Nobel Peace Prize. Micro-
finance is manifold in its appeal. It is radical in its suggestion that the poor are creditworthy and con-
servative in its insistence on individual responsibility. It offers, as the cliché goes, a hand up, not a hand-
out. Because its currency is currency itself, microcredit makes supporters feel that their hands are reach-
ing out directly to the poor. And microfinance, especially when channeled to women, is seen as demon-
strably lifting people out of poverty. Mohammad Yunus, the visionary founder of the Grameen Bank, 
often cites the figure that “5 percent of the Grameen borrowers get out of poverty every year.”
1 
Yet against this strong appeal, a natural question has long been asked: how robust is the evidence 
that microcredit works? The question only gains in importance as microcredit touches more lives and 
attracts more (but scarce) government and private funding. Of course, “works” can mean many things. 
By one definition, the existence of thriving, competing microfinance organizations and the voluntary 
patronage of millions of poor people is success in itself. After all, no one asks whether the thriving mo-
bile phone business in the Congo is “working.” But by a definition often used by program evaluators and 
academic researchers, the test is whether the interventions measurably improved the lives of the poor, 
such as through higher or more stable household consumption. Many studies have attempted to put mi-
crofinance to that test, and a few have merited publications in economics journals. In this paper, we revi-
sit the most influential among those studies, including the source of the figure that Yunus cites. 
During its first 20 years, the literature on the impact of microcredit relied almost exclusively on 
non-experimental methods (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, ch. 8). The challenges of estab-
lishing causality in such studies are well-known. They include potential biases from omitted variables as 
                                                 




well as non-random program placement, client selection and self-selection, and attrition.
2 
A few studies, however, have made strong claims to causal identification. Most of these are 
based on household surveys funded by the World Bank and carried out with the Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies in Bangladesh—three rounds in 1991–92 and a fourth in 1999. In particular, Pitt 
and Khandker (1998, henceforth PK) and Khandker (2005, henceforth simply Khandker) have exercised 
the most influence within and beyond academia.
3 PK uses the data from the first three seasonal rounds 
and claims quasi-experimental identification; Khandker does not assert a quasi-experiment but takes ad-
vantage of the panel dimension introduced by the 1999 follow-up round to strengthen identification. 
These studies have gained credence and interest from their focus on Bangladesh, a hotbed of microfin-
ance; from the dimensions of the data set (some 1800 households with 7–8-year follow-up); and from 
understandings, demonstrated in sophisticated economic and econometric analysis, of the challenges to 
identification. 
The studies also exercise great influence beyond the research community. PK’s headline result is 
that “annual household consumption expenditure increases 18 taka for every 100 additional taka bor-
rowed by women…compared with 11 taka for men.” In a book, Khandker (1998, p. 56) extrapolates 
from this finding, derived from the early 1990s data, to the poverty impact Yunus has cited. Meanwhile, 
a literature survey commissioned by the U.S.-based Grameen Foundation judges that Khandker’s 2005 
paper, the one incorporating all the 1990s data, “may…be the most reliable impact evaluation of a mi-
crofinance program to date” (Goldberg 2005). The president of Freedom from Hunger, a global micro-
finance group, follows suit, describing Khandker as the “one major study of microfinance impact on po-
                                                 
2 One prominent encounter with these difficulties: in the late 1990s, the U.S. Agency for International Development commis-
sioned studies using new members as controls for old ones in evaluation. But that method can bias results to the extent that 
cohorts differ systematically, e.g., because of attrition (Karlan 2001). 
3 Also based on this data set are Khandker (1996, 2000); Pitt et al. (1999); Pitt (2000); McKernan (2002); Pitt and Khandker 
(2002); Pitt et al. (2003); Menon (2005); Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright (2006); and Chemin (2008). Kaboski and Townsend 




verty that stands out” (Dunford 2006). 
We think these Bangladesh-based papers are worth revisiting for two reasons. First, they have 
not gone without criticism. The most prominent are in Morduch (1998, henceforth Morduch), which 
questions assumptions at the heart of PK’s asserted quasi-experiment and fails to match their main re-
sults with a simpler estimator. (Morduch does find evidence that microcredit reduces consumption vola-
tility.) Neither Morduch nor Pitt’s (1999) response were published, and their separate estimates were 
never reconciled, so the debate over this research effort remains unresolved.
4 Second, as the economics 
profession and major donors shift toward randomized studies, the value of non-randomized approaches 
is a live question.
5 Our intuition is that randomized and non-randomized approaches have different 
strengths and weaknesses—non-randomized ones, for example, can opportunistically exploit natural ex-
periments—and that the optimal research portfolio from the point of view of policy should blend the 
two. Less clear is exactly when non-experimental studies are worth performing. 
After going through a replication exercise—applying the same methods to the same data as in 
PK, Morduch, and Khandker—and performing related Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) regressions, we 
come to doubt the positive results in all three. With regard to the headline PK finding, our replication 
generates results opposite in sign. But we do not conclude that microcredit harms; rather, specification 
tests suggest that the instrumentation strategy is failing, that reverse or omitted-variable causation is 
driving the results, and that the endogenous credit-consumption relationship varies substantially by sub-
sample, as well as borrower sex, which can explain the seeming gender differential in impact. We offer 
data that question the basis for the quasi-experimental identification in PK (and by extension in Mor-
duch) and show how, in Khandker, exploiting the panel dimension does not compensate for the lack of 
clearly exogenous variation in the treatment variable. As a result, strikingly, 30 years into the microfin-
                                                 
4 Morduch discusses PK in Morduch (1999) and discusses Khandker in Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), neither 
of which were refereed nor provide alternative estimates. 




ance movement we have little solid evidence that it improves the lives of clients in measurable ways. 
At the risk of over-generalizing from one data point, this experience leads us to conclude that 
when studying causality in social systems with strong endogeneity, claims of non-experimental identifi-
cation need to be held to demanding standards. The experience also casts doubt on the power of sophis-
ticated parametric techniques to compensate for the lack of such. 
The next three sections of this paper describe the identification strategies and results of the three 
papers of interest and the findings from our replications. The conclusion summarizes and explores the 
broader lessons. 
Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
The study 
PK analyze surveys of 1,798 households in 87 villages within 29 randomly selected upazillas of Bangla-
desh in 1991–92. (At the time, the country was divided into 391 upazillas.) The surveyors visited the 
households after each of the three main rice seasons—Aman (December–January), Boro (April–May), 
and Aus (July–August)—losing only 29 households from the sample over the period. The surveyors 
oversampled households participating in one of the three credit programs evaluated—those of the Gra-
meen Bank, a large NGO called BRAC, and the official Bangladesh Rural Development Board 
(BRDB)—and oversampled eligible nonparticipants. Since sampling on the basis of eligibility can bias 
results, PK incorporate sampling weights that are constructed from censuses taken in each study village. 
All three credit programs formally defined eligibility in terms of land ownership: only functionally land-
less households, defined as those owning half an acre or less, could borrow.
6 Although most group-
based microcredit in Bangladesh now goes to women, the earliest experiments carried out by Yunus and 
his students in the 1970s targeted men. The shift toward women occurred during the 1980s. Thus in the 
                                                 
6 Among the three creditors, Grameen at least also applied an alternative eligibility criterion: ownership of assets worth less 
than one acre of medium-quality land (Hossain 1988, p. 25). However, PK emphasize the half-acre rule in their analysis by, 




1991–92 surveys, 10 villages had only male borrowing groups, 22 had only female groups, and 40 had 
both. All groups were single-sex. 
In the PK estimation set-up, the three-way split by credit supplier and the two-way split by gend-
er lead to six parameters of interest for a given outcome. A central feature of the estimation problem is 
that credit variables, by supplier and gender, are at once potentially endogenous and censored (Tobit). 
Meanwhile, some of the outcomes, such as labor supply and girl’s school enrollment, are themselves 
censored or binary. PK therefore estimate the key impact parameters using a limited-information maxi-
mum likelihood (LIML) framework that effectively allows for instrumental variables and appropriately 
handles censoring. The model contains equations for the outcome variable of interest, for female bor-
rowing, and for male borrowing. The outcome is variously modeled as continuous and unbounded (for 
log weekly household consumption), Tobit (female non-land assets, female and male labor supply per 
month), or probit (school enrollment of school-age boys or girls). To state the model precisely, let    
and    be dummies indicating whether credit groups composed of females or males are operating in a 
given village; and let   be a dummy for whether a household meets the eligibility criteria of such pro-
grams, regardless of whether any operate in the village. Then the credit choice variables indicating 
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Let    be the outcome. For some outcomes    is modeled as Tobit or probit. But since we focus on 
household consumption, we will assume    is continuous and unbounded. Let    and    be total bor-
rowings of all female and all male household members, let            ,    ,    ,    ,    ,       be the 
six credit variables disaggregated by program as well as gender, and   be a vector of exogenous con-
trols. Then the PK model is  
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where   is the credit censoring level,   is a 3×3 positive-definite symmetric matrix, and 1{} indicates a 
dummy. 
The PK econometric model is innovative and can be counterintuitive for those unfamiliar with 
the methods. All three equations include exactly the same set of regressors on the right-hand-side, ex-
cept of course that the outcome equation also includes credit variables. Superficially, there appear to be 
no excluded instruments.
7 Meanwhile, the credit equations’ samples are restricted, which means that the 
number of equations in the model varies by observation. A final counterintuitive feature is that the out-
come equation contains six endogenous credit variables—one for each gender and program—but the 
                                                 
7 In fact, exclusion restrictions become less necessary for identification in the presence of censoring. Wilde (2000) shows that 




model includes just two instrumenting equations (those for   
  and   
  ). 
Despite this combination of unusual features, the intuition behind the model is analogous to a 
conventional two-stage instrumental variables set-up in which all equations apply to all observations but 
all right-hand side variables in the instrumenting equations are entered after being interacted with dum-
mies for those equations’ samples in the LIML set-up: 
  
                 
  
                  
(2)
(The inclusion of C sets   
  and   
   to the censoring level when credit is not available.) Thus PK effec-
tively instrument for the borrowing variable with interactions between the credit choice dummies and all 
the included exogenous variables. In PK, these exogenous variables include age, sex, and education of 
the household head; other household characteristics; a set of village characteristics or dummies; and, in 
the case of regressions on individual-level data, individual characteristics. They also include the constant 
term, so that    and    are themselves instruments. To understand how it is possible to have six credit 
variables in the final stage while instrumenting two more aggregated ones in the first stage, we can im-
agine instrumenting all six distinctly and imposing constraints that equate first-stage coefficients across 
the three lending programs. 
As multi-equation systems that mix Tobit, probit, and classical continuous and unbounded va-
riables, the PK models for various outcomes are conditional, recursive, fully observed, mixed-process 
systems. They are recursive in that they contain clear stages, in this case two, and do not model simulta-
neous causation.
8 They are fully observed (Roodman 2009b) in that the observed    and   , not the la-
tent   
  and   
  , appear in the    equation.
9 The models are mixed-process in that they combine equations 
                                                 
8 That simultaneous causation is hypothesized in reality is what makes the models LIML rather than full-information maxi-
mum likelihood (FIML). 




that have various types of censoring. And the models are conditional in that their specifics, such as the 
number of equations, vary by observation, being conditional on the data. A naïve approach to estimating 
the PK system is to use a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) likelihood.
10 Within the    equation, 
this treats     and   the same way mathematically, to that extent ignoring the endogenous nature of the 
credit variables. An underappreciated fact, which PK implicitly exploit, is that the naïve SUR is actually 
correct for fully-observed recursive systems (Roodman 2009b). Thus, for example, the standard SUR 
bivariate probit estimator is consistent and efficient for a two-stage, two-equation instrumental variable 
model in which both stages are probit (Greene 1998).
11 The econometric literature on recursive mixed-
process models historically focused on multi-stage estimation procedures that are less computationally 
demanding than Maximum Likelihood (ML), if less efficient (e.g., Amemiya 1974; Heckman 1976; 
Maddala 1983, chs. 7–8; Smith and Blundell 1986; Rivers and Vuong 1988). Faster computers have 
made direct ML estimation more practical, and PK is a leading example. 
As stated, the PK model assumes spherical errors. Of interest is how much this assumption can 
be relaxed. In fact, heteroskedasticity can render Tobit-type models inconsistent. To this important ex-
tent, PK implicitly assume homoskedasticity. They do, however, explicitly allow for correlations across 
observations within households—across seasons or, in individual-level regressions, across individuals—
by computing clustered standard errors. In other words, they assume identically but not independently 
distributed errors. 
Since    and    are the bases for all instruments in (2) and are instruments themselves, a key to 
this identification strategy, as PK emphasize, is that    and    are exogenous after conditioning on con-
trols. Specifically, the factors driving credit choice—the formation of credit groups by village and gend-
                                                 
10 This is complicated because the likelihood for a given observation depends on the number of equations that are relevant 
and on which credit variables, if any, are censored. See PK’s appendix and Roodman (2009b). 
11 Even in this simple case, Greene uses the phrases “surprisingly” and “seem not to be widely known” in asserting consisten-




er, and whether individual households are eligible—must be exogenous. Analyzing these assumptions 
economically and testing them econometrically are therefore important. PK do not appear to offer a rea-
soned defense of the exogeneity of the first factor. They do make one for the second, the exogeneity of 
landholdings: “Market turnover of land is well known to be low in South Asia. The absence of an active 
land market is the rationale given for the treatment of landownership as an exogenous regressor in al-
most all the empirical work on household behavior in South Asia” (p. 970). However, this appears to be 
a case for landholdings being external to the model (Heckman 2000). Exogeneity is a distinct notion 
(Brock and Durlauf 2001; Deaton 2009), requiring that landholdings are related to outcomes only 
through microcredit after linearly conditioning on controls. Meanwhile, one disadvantage of the LIML 
estimator is that it does not offer an easy way to test the assertion of instrument validity. In the Genera-
lized Method of Moments framework (including 2SLS), the Hansen test is available for over-identified 
models such as these. 
As Morduch notes, both of the key PK identifying assumptions are open to important questions. 
As for the first, regarding the formation of the credit groups by gender and village, PK recognize that 
unobserved factors could affect both group formation and outcomes, creating endogeneity. Their strong-
est response is to include village dummies to control for any such factors at the village level. Morduch’s 
concern is about sub-village effects— that village effects are not fixed within villages. For example, in 
villages where the portion of eligible households is relatively well-off, credit group formation may be 
more likely and outcomes systematically better. In reply, Pitt (1999) acknowledges these potential non-
linearities by adding interaction terms between landholdings and all the   variables to PK’s instrument 
set. If anything, it strengthens their results.  
As for the exogeneity of the second factor inside the credit choice dummy, household landhold-




tial and presumably endogenous mistargeting. We find that 203 of the 905 households in the 1991–92 
sample that borrowed owned more than 0.5 acres before borrowing—1.5 acres on average. Evidently, 
loan officers were pragmatically bending the eligibility rule to extend credit to borrowers who seemed 
reliable and who were poor by global standards. Thus the de facto rule at work in the PK estimates is 
that any household that was de jure eligible or that borrowed was “eligible.” Some of over-half-acre 
households that borrowed may have been met an alternative eligibility criterion (see footnote 6), but 
Lowess plots of borrowing probability against the area or value of landholdings among households only 
reinforce the impression of substantial mistargeting that runs counter to the banks’ stated ideals. (See 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. The sample for each line is restricted to households in villages where microcredit 
is offered to people of the given sex.) Pitt’s (1999) reply to Morduch points out that identification with 
LIML requires not that the rule be perfectly observed but that it drive an exogenous component of varia-
tion in borrowing. In a sense, Pitt casts the identification strategy as a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity 
(FRD) design, albeit an unusual one that uses all observations, not just those near the threshold.
12 The 
upshot, though, is that both of the key claims behind the PK quasi-experimental design are asserted ra-
ther than being clear in the data.
13 
                                                 
12 PK footnote 16: “The quasi-experimental identification strategy used here is an example of the regression discontinuity 
design.” 
13 Ito (1999) describes a mid-1990s Grameen Bank village in her doctoral dissertation: “One bank member I met outside my 
study area made no efforts to hide the fact that her husband had always owned 1.5 acres of land, which was three times as 
much as the Bank's targeting line. The woman explained it simply: ‘The Bank informed us that we had to be 'bhumi-hin ' 
(landless) to become a bank member. So we decided to call ourselves bhumi-hin ever since.’ Thus the Bank seems to be ac-
cepting almost any applicant whom current group members bring in, as long as one does not have a bad record with the Bank 
in the past.” 




Figure 1. Probability of borrowing vs. area of household land before borrowing (Lowess) , house-
holds with access to credit for given gender 
 
Figure 2. Probability of borrowing vs. value of household land before borrowing (Lowess), house-
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The PK credit variables are simple sums of all borrowing from the three microcredit programs 
since December 1986, adjusting for inflation; they are taken in logs and modeled as censored from be-
low. This definition raises two subtle methodological questions. First, taking the simple sum of past bor-
rowings implicitly imposes the assumption that borrowings in 1987, borrowings in 1988, etc., all affect 
consumption in 1991–92 with the same coefficient. In fact, we would expect the effects to vary over 
time. However, because borrowings in successive years tend to be collinear—typically, after paying off 
one one-year loan, a client immediately takes out a larger one—identifying the time profile within a 
five-year period would be difficult. 
Second, modeling the log of cumulative borrowing as censored forces a choice about what small 
value the assumed censoring level should take. The difference between 1 and 10 taka, say, is minor in 
levels since most loans are thousands of taka, but major in logs. Although this issue is ultimately sec-
ondary to our conclusions, it may help explain large differences between the original regressions and our 
replications in the magnitudes of coefficients of interest (though not in the signs or significance). The 
lowest observed non-zero value for a credit variable is 1,000, and PK use 1,000 in a simplified example 
without logarithms in their appendix. For these reasons, we censor with log 1,000 ≈ 6.9. We have not 
ascertained what level the PK regressions use, but have reasons to think that it is log 1 = 0, the chief be-
ing that we get a better match in OLS using that value.
14 Figure 3 illustrates the issue with a scatter of 
cumulative female borrowing versus weekly household per-capita consumption using the full PK sample 
for all three survey rounds. The columns of dots at 0 and 6.9 correspond to the same data points and re-
flect different censoring values. One can see the reasonableness of log 1,000 as a censoring value; and 
how using log 1 would substantially flatten lines fit to the data, reducing coefficients even if not affect-
ing signs or statistical distance from 0. 
                                                 
14 A dataset provided by Mark Pitt includes some credit variables censored at log 1,000 and others at log 1. Pitt cautioned that 




Figure 3. Household borrowing by women vs. household consumption, with censoring levels of log 
1 or log 1,000 
 
The replication 
Using a new program written for Stata, called “cmp” for “conditional mixed process” (Roodman 2009b), 
we replicate all of the PK regressions, in the sense of applying the same methods to the same data. In the 
case of the household consumption outcome variable, which is continuous and unbounded, we also run 
2SLS analogs motivated by the intuitions above. We first confirmed that our estimation software works 
properly on a simulated data set constructed by a program (sim7.do) included in Pitt (1999) (see Appen-
dix). And we use the “cmp” program that performs the LIML to exactly match the output of half a dozen 
multi-equation commands written by the Stata Corporation, such as for Heckman selection models 
(Roodman 2009b). 
We then begin the replication of the PK regressions by returning to the original survey data and 
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reconstructing the data table used for estimation.
15 Predictably, benchmarking against the means and 
standard deviations in the PK appendix and the partial data set shared by Mark Pitt surfaces a few appar-
ent errors on both sides. Coming second affords us the luxury of correcting ours before publication.
16 On 
the PK side, it appears that their female non-land assets variable actually includes land; the years-of-
education variables treat current students has having completed no grades; the enrollment variable for 
children aged 5–17 is computed for 18-year-olds too; and the “cumulative borrowing since December 
1986” variables include a few older loans. These problems do not turn out to be major concerns. Ac-
counting for these differences, the match between the data sets appears to be very good. (See Table 1 
and Table 2.) For right-hand-side variables, including credit variables, the means and standard devia-
tions are close. Where we can compare at the observation level, almost all correlation coefficients ex-
ceed 0.97. (Not shown in either table is that the correlation for the dependent variable of central interest, 
log household per-capita consumption, is 0.995.) The same goes for left-hand-side variables; Table 2 
shows only the aggregates from the new data set but can be compared to directly PK’s Table A2. Sub-
sample sizes match exactly and aggregates are close. 
                                                 
15 The survey data for all rounds are now at go.worldbank.org/E9WWFZIXJ0. 
16 329 of the 12,679.loans in the data were taken before December 1986. We correct the first two errors listed in text. But for 
simplicity and accuracy of replication we imitate the last two, which are minor. Correcting them does not materially affect 












Age of all individuals   23 18 23 18
Schooling of individual aged 5 or above (years)   1.377 2.773 2.066 3.136
Schooling of individual 5 or above (years, current students=0) 1.391 2.784
Parents of household head own land?   0.256 0.564 0.254 0.563 0.992
# of brothers of household head owning land 0.815 1.308 0.810 1.305 0.978
# of sisters of household head owning land 0.755 1.208 0.750 1.206 0.988
Parents of household head's spouse own land? 0.529 0.784 0.529 0.783 0.986
# of brothers of household head's spouse owning land 0.919 1.427 0.919 1.427 0.980
# of sisters of household head's spouse owning land 0.753 1.202 0.753 1.202 0.985
Household land (in decimals)   76.142 108.540 76.145 108.052 0.999
Highest grade completed by household head   2.486 3.501 2.523 3.525 0.987
Sex of household head (1 = male)   0.948 0.223 0.948 0.223 0.998
Age of household head (years)   40.821 12.795 40.874 12.789 1.000
Highest grade completed by any female household member 1.606 2.853 1.664 2.999
Highest grade completed by any male household member 3.082 3.081 3.277 4.016
Highest grade by any female HH member (current students=0) 1.539 2.829 0.972
2
Highest grade by any male HH member (current students=0) 3.046 3.805 0.991
2
Adult female not present in household?   0.017 0.129 0.017 0.129 1.000
Adult male not present in household?   0.035 0.185 0.035 0.185 1.000
Spouse not present in household?   0.126 0.332 0.123 0.329 0.950
Amount borrowed by female from BRAC (taka) 350 1,574 349 1,564 0.988
Amount borrowed by male from BRAC (taka) 172 1,565 173 1,575 0.980
Amount borrowed by female from BRDB (taka) 114 747 114 746 0.978
Amount borrowed by male from BRDB (taka) 203 1,573 204 1,576 0.995
Amount borrowed by female from Grameen (taka) 956 4,293 972 4,324 0.986
Amount borrowed by male from Grameen Bank (taka) 374 2,923 360 2,895 0.957
Nontarget household   0.295 0.456 0.295 0.456
Has any primary school?   0.686 0.464 0.686 0.464
Has rural health center?   0.300 0.458 0.064 0.246
Has family planning center?   0.097 0.296 0.097 0.296
Is dai/midwife available?   0.673 0.469 0.673 0.469
Price of rice   11.15 0.85 11.15 0.85
Price of wheat flour   9.59 1.00 9.59 1.00
Price of mustard oil   52.65 5.96 52.65 5.96
Price of hen egg   2.46 1.81 2.46 1.81
Price of milk   12.54 3.04 12.54 3.04
Price of potato   3.74 1.59 3.74 1.49
Average female wage   16.154 9.613 16.154 9.613
No female wage dummy   0.193 0.395 0.193 0.395
Average male wage   37.893 9.4 37.893 9.4
Distance to bank (km)   3.49 2.85 3.49 2.85
New data set Reported in PK
1Based on all three rounds from a household-level data set shared by Mark Pitt. 
2Correlations are with PK variables 




Table 2. Weighted means and standard deviations of PK endogenous variables, new data set 
 
 
As a first step in understanding the relationship between microcredit and household consumption 
in the 1991–92 data, Figure 4 and Figure 5 exhibit simple bivariate linear and Lowess regressions of past 
cumulative male and female microcredit borrowing against current household consumption per capita, 






5,619.540     2,661.615     2,661.615    
(7,608.565) (5,940.411) (5,940.411)
N = 779 N = 326 N = 1,105 N = 1,105
3,854.775     1,771.669     1,771.669    
(7,482.515) (5,423.560) (5,423.560)
N = 631 N = 263 N = 894 N = 894
0.535           0.528           0.531           0.552           0.534          
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.498) (0.499)
N = 802 N = 434 N = 1,236 N = 225 N = 1,461
0.566           0.555           0.558           0.553           0.557          
(0.496) (0.498) (0.497) (0.498) (0.497)
N = 856 N = 468 N = 1,324 N = 267 N = 1,591
40.390         32.438         35.068         31.238         34.446        
(70.532) (64.283) (66.512) (60.202) (65.540)
N = 3,420 N = 2,108 N = 5,528 N = 1,074 N = 6,602
202.747       185.779       191.252       180.604       189.371      
(100.817) (104.870) (103.872) (99.400) (103.168)
N = 3,534 N = 2,254 N = 5,788 N = 1,126 N = 6,914
76.537         85.250         82.376         88.993         83.475        
(44.862) (64.986) (59.241) (66.212) (60.498)
N = 2,696 N = 1,650 N = 4,346 N = 872 N = 5,218
2,365.546     1,736.295     1,945.805     838.152       1,759.426    
(6,695.634) (5,048.828) (5,656.181) (2,212.449) (5,253.494)
N = 899 N = 542 N = 1,441 N = 292 N = 1,733
7,503.448     4,831.695     5,721.258     1,997.424     5,094.669    
(31,557.500) (19,994.800) (24,482.600) (6,480.442) (22,527.100)
N = 899 N = 542 N = 1,441 N = 292 N = 1,733
Based on round 1 data. 
1PK report using school enrollment for ages 5–17, but 5–18 produces a near-perfect 
match with the enrollment variable aggregates in their Table A2. 
Program villages
Per capita household total expenditure 
(taka/week) 
Female assets (taka) 
Female nonland assets (taka) 
Cumulative female borrowing (1992 taka)
Cumulative male borrowing (1992 taka)
Current school enrollment of girls aged 
5–18 years (yes = 1)
1
Current school enrollment of boys aged 
5–18 years (yes = 1)
1
Women’s labor supply (hours/month, 
aged 16–59 years) 
Men’s labor supply (hours/month, aged 




some of the texture of the underlying data, not to make formal inferences. And in this spirit of data ex-
ploration, we reverse the roles that PK assign the credit and consumption variables—treating credit as 
dependent and putting it on the vertical axis—because it gives a clearer picture of potential selection bi-
ases.
17 Importantly, this reversal does not affect what interests us most, the signs of the slopes of certain 
best-fit lines that represent impact estimates. OLS regressions of y on x and x on y yield the same sign. 
The first graph, Figure 4, covers “target” households only: all those owning less than half an 
acre, whether in program or non-program villages, and those with more than half an acre that borrowed 
anyway. The second graph covers the full sample.
18 Several facts become clear. First, the observed cre-
dit-consumption relationship differs by gender. Second, it is highly nonlinear. For the full sample of 
women, it is inverted-“U” shaped. This pattern is compatible with the frequently observed reality that 
the poorest are excluded (or self-excluded) from microcredit programs. Habibah, the powerful captain of 
a “center” of some 30 Grameen borrowers in the Tangail district of Bangladesh (and a borrower herself), 
explained how she thinks about member selection: “They should not be [too] landed, but they should 
own some land—some house land and some vegetable land. They should not be extremely poor. Most 
important, they should be hard working, not just the wife but also the husband” (Todd 1996, p. 173). 
The curve for men also tends toward an inverted “U,” except that borrowing picks up at the high end. 
Finally, in moving from Figure 4 to Figure 5, adding the non-borrowing and generally affluent non-
target households pulls down the right ends of all the contours. This is as it should be; but we note for 
future reference that the causal link here is almost certainly endogenous from the point of view of im-
pact evaluation, running from being a household with a high consumption level to having a low (zero) 
probability of being a microcredit borrower. 
                                                 
17 Plots with the axes reversed are available from the authors. 
18 All the analysis of PK copies them in excluding households with more than 5 acres—41 households in round 1 and 43 in 




Figure 4. Household borrowing by women and men vs. household consumption, target households 
only (Lowess and linear) 
 
Figure 5. Household borrowing by women and men vs. household consumption, full PK sample 
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Figure 6 and Figure 7 have the same format, but are constructed to execute a 2SLS analog of the 
PK estimator.
19 Before graphing, the credit variables are linearly projected onto their instruments within 
the appropriate subsamples, according to (1). Then the controls—household characteristics, survey 
round and village dummies—are partialled out from the projected credit variables and household con-
sumption. 2SLS is consistent (Kelejian 1971) but less efficient because it neglects the censored nature of 
credit. (On the other hand, it is superior in being robust to heteroskedasticity.) If the PK identifying as-
sumptions hold, weighted linear fits to these residuals are consistent estimates of the impacts of female 
and male borrowing on household spending. These residuals are the bases for the graphs. For consisten-
cy with previous graphs, we regress the credit residuals on the consumption residuals rather than vice 
versa, so the lines reveal only the sign of the estimated impact. (In our formal analysis below we regress 
in the other direction, as an impact analysis demands.) In examining the two new figures, note first the 
continuities with the previous two. In all four, the best-fit lines for men and women seem distinct—
though whether statistically so remains to be seen. And in the both pairs, adding non-target households 
pulls down the right ends of the best-fit lines. Finally, the slopes of the full-sample best-fit lines for 
women’s credit (in Figure 5 and Figure 7) are both negative. 
                                                 




Figure 6. Household borrowing by women and men vs. household consumption, controlling for all 
covariates, target households only (Lowess and linear) 
 
Figure 7. Household borrowing by women and men vs. household consumption, instrumenting 
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These graphs hint at several conclusions about the PK results. First, the negative slope on wom-
en’s credit in Figure 7 contradicts the headline PK result to which it directly corresponds, namely their 
finding that lending a woman 100 taka raises household consumption by 18 taka/year. Meanwhile, add-
ing non-target households—moving from Figure 6 to Figure 7—appears to perturb the parameter esti-
mates implied by the best fit lines. To the extent that the instruments are valid and the causal relation-
ship between credit and consumption within this added sample is endogenous, as argued earlier, this 
should not happen. That it does raises worries about the effectiveness of the instrumentation strategy. In 
the same vein, the differences throughout between male and female regression curves resonate with the 
tendency in the PK results for coefficients on the three male and the three female credit variables, as 
groups, to differ systematically from each other. It too hints that these differences reflect endogeneity. 
The non- and semi-parametric regressions are meant to provide intuition and motivation. For 
more rigorous tests, we run all the PK household consumption specifications on both the target house-
hold and full samples, paralleling the graphs. (Where PK run “naïve” Ordinary Least Squares regres-
sions on the target subsample and LIML on the full sample, we do both on both.) The highlights are in 
Table 3, which reports results from OLS; from LIML with controls for the 14 village characteristics 
listed at the bottom of Table 1; and from LIML with village dummies. Note that the LIML regression 
are identified even on the target subsample, because while   does not vary over the subsample,    and 
  , thus    and    still do; in other words, the PK assumption about the exogeneity of the gender status 




Table 3. Estimates of impact of cumulative borrowing on log per capita household consumption, 
PK estimators, target households only 
 
 
The regression results match the graphs. While the OLS point estimates for the target subsample 
do not match PK’s, the pattern of significance is similar, putting statistically positive coefficients on all 
but the female-BRDB and male-Grameen credit variables. But in the regression that is meant to replicate 
the headline results (last column of Table 3), the coefficients on all three female credit variables are 
strongly negative. This is true too of the preceding regression with 14 village controls instead of village 
dummies. Comparing regressions in the two halves of the table, in every case adding non-target house-










Log female borrowing from BRAC  0.034 0.008 –0.021 0.016 –0.107 –0.103
(2.468)** (0.156) (0.398) (1.163) (2.586)*** (2.696)***
Log male borrowing from BRAC  0.042 –0.010 –0.007 0.024 –0.022 –0.000
(2.131)** (0.219) (0.165) (1.194) (0.437) (0.007)
Log female borrowing from BRDB 0.016 –0.011 –0.029 –0.007 –0.142 –0.146
(0.928) (0.187) (0.433) (0.397) (2.926)*** (2.940)***
Log male borrowing from BRDB 0.036 –0.016 0.032 0.022 –0.035 0.005
(3.139)*** (0.501) (0.915) (1.962)** (0.871) (0.100)
Log female borrowing from Grameen 0.017 –0.006 –0.015 0.001 –0.099 –0.087
(2.324)** (0.151) (0.356) (0.101) (3.200)*** (3.116)***
Log male borrowing from Grameen 0.000 –0.041 –0.008 –0.017 –0.052 –0.012
(0.017) (1.384) (0.240) (1.452) (1.491) (0.313)
Observations 4,567 4,567 4,567 5,218 5,218 5,218
Log pseudolikelihood –2054.73 –6261.57 –5842.03 –2683.09 –7227.65 –6711.62
Target households only All households
"Target households" includes those that would be eligible if credit programs operated in their villages. HH 
characteristics are: sex, age, and education level of household head; log landholdings before borrowing; how many 
parents, brothers, and sisters of household head or spouse own land (spearately); highest grade completed by any 
female or (separately) male household member; highest grade by any female or (separately) male HH member; dummies 
for survey rounds, whether no adult female or (separately) male is present in household, whether the HH head’s 
spouse is not present, and whether the HH borrowed. Village characteristics are: separate dummies for whether a 
primary school, rural health center, family planning center, or midwife are available; prices of rice, wheat flour, mustard 
oil, hen’s eggs, milk, potatoes; average female and (separately) male wage; dummy for female wage data availability; 
distance to nearest bank. Absolute t statistics (columns 1 and 4) and z statistics clustered by household (other 
columns) in parenthesis. All regressions are weighted. *significant at 10%. **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%.
LIML, controlling for HH 
characteristics and…
LIML, controlling for HH 





The sharp contradiction of PK’s headline result poses a mystery. To check our results, we run the 
same estimation program on the data set provided by Mark Pitt.
20 The coefficients on female credit re-
main strongly negative. 2SLS regressions reported below also produce results of the same profile on 
Pitt’s data set and ours. In an additional variant, we constrain the fit to match PK’s published results; this 
reduces the maximum likelihood achieved. We also re-estimate using log 1 instead of log 1,000 for zero-
observations of credit variables; this reduces coefficient magnitudes but by and large does not affect 
signs and significance.
21  
If the PK identifying assumptions hold, then both LIML fixed effects estimates in Table 3 are 
consistent; yet they are statistically different, the first essentially putting a 0 on female credit, the second 
a strong negative sign. This difference admits at least two explanations. One is that the effect of female 
credit on consumption is heterogeneous: its impact on target households is minimal, explaining the flat 
LIML results in the left half of Table 3 (and likewise in Figure 6), but the exclusion or self-exclusion of 
affluent non-target households is good for them, enough so that it makes the average “benefit” negative 
in the full sample. A second story, which we find more plausible, is that household decisions to borrow, 
as functions of household prosperity, are nonlinear and heterogeneous and differ by gender. This endo-
genous-causation theory would imply that the PK instrumentation strategy is not working as well as one 
would hope. 
To examine the instrumentation, we run 2SLS analogs of the headline LIML fixed effects regres-
sion. Modeling on (2), we instrument with all the     and     interaction terms, where   includes village 
dummies. As noted earlier, 2SLS is consistent but less efficient under the PK assumptions. Using 2SLS 
opens the door to well-developed tests of instrumentation. The first column of Table 4 shows that the 
                                                 
20 See note 14. 




closest 2SLS analog provides a rough match to PK’s headline LIML fixed-effects regression. The abso-
lute t statistics on the female credit variables weaken as expected, to 1.4–1.9, but the coefficients are all 
negative and generally lower than the male credit coefficients. What is wholly new is the Hansen J test, 
which takes advantage of the overidentification to test instrument exogeneity. The test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are jointly valid at a p value of 0.038. In order to investigate which in-
struments are causing the trouble, we run difference-Hansen tests on various subsets and experiment 
with dropping them. The difference-Hansen tests reported in column 1 show where our suspicion settles: 
on the instruments that are interaction of the female and male credit choice dummies with a) the survey 
round dummies and b) the village dummies. In the right half of the table, we heed this cue about non-
excludability by including these two groups of interaction terms as controls. Focusing on the first col-
umn in the right half, we see that both groups are reasonably, jointly significant according to F tests. On 
the one hand, this finding justifies Morduch’s concern that village (as well as season) effects are not 
fixed between eligible and ineligible households: they are omitted variables in the PK specification. On 
the other, we find as Pitt does that including them actually strengthens our most significant results. In 
our case those results are negative coefficients on female credit. 
The Hansen test, performed here with household-clustered standard errors, is robust to hete-
roskedasticity and autocorrelation. However, this generality also weakens the test. If we run the regres-
sions separately for each round, which one observation per household, we can exploit PK’s assumptions 
of homoskedasticity and error correlation only within households, to apply the more-powerful Sargan 
test. It is valid where errors are i.i.d. Columns 2–4 of both halves of Table 4 show these regressions and 
the associated Sargan tests. In the right half, we see that the regression that passes the Hansen test ac-




Table 4. PK-analogous 2SLS estimates of impact of cumulative borrowing on log per capita 
household consumption, all households 
 
 
The failures on the Sargan tests can be interpreted in two ways. The assumption of homoskedas-
ticity does not hold, in which the Sargan test should not be trusted, or it does hold and the excluded in-
struments are invalid. Either possibility would undermine the PK estimator. Only the latter would un-
dermine the 2SLS estimate in column 5 of Table 4. So perhaps that regression is evidence that micro-
lending to women reduces household consumption. Given all the doubts raised, though, we are not ready 
to conclude that microcredit does harm. 
R o u n d s  1 – 3R o u n d  1R o u n d  2R o u n d  3R o u n d s  1 – 3R o u n d  1R o u n d  2R o u n d  3
Log female borrowing from BRAC  –0.122 –0.109 –0.119 –0.075 –0.191 –0.070 –0.209 –0.450
(1.439) (0.917) (1.089) (0.755) (0.905) (0.252) (0.825) (1.584)
Log male borrowing from BRAC  0.213 0.308 0.062 0.208 0.482 0.291 –0.126 0.748
(1.825)* (2.186)** (0.365) (1.554) (1.434) (0.841) (0.300) (1.642)
Log female borrowing from BRDB –0.304 –0.037 –0.543 –0.234 –1.209 –0.545 –0.859 –1.118
(1.890)* (0.192) (2.409)** (1.403) (2.419)** (0.866) (1.515) (2.014)**
Log male borrowing from BRDB –0.135 –0.244 0.009 –0.237 –0.462 –0.335 0.463 –0.616
(1.030) (1.399) (0.060) (1.522) (2.247)** (1.356) (1.479) (1.659)*
Log female borrowing from Grameen –0.057 –0.103 –0.043 –0.004 0.171 0.393 0.208 0.157
(1.474) (1.639) (0.893) (0.092) (1.145) (2.184)** (1.189) (0.882)
Log male borrowing from Grameen –0.063 –0.141 –0.015 –0.055 –0.032 –0.001 0.035 0.030
(0.920) (1.730)* (0.161) (0.567) (0.318) (0.006) (0.213) (0.205)
Interaction terms using
Survey round dummies (F test p value) 0.136
Village dummies (F test p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 5,218 1,757 1,735 1,726 5,218 1,757 1,735 1,726
Tests of joint validity of instruments
Sargan, all instruments (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.688
Hansen, all instruments (p value) 0.038 0.012 0.058 0.046 0.927 0.532 0.895 0.968
Diff-Hansen, interaction terms using
Survey round dummies (p value) 0.090
Village dummies (p value) 0.106 0.160 0.035 0.124
Analogously with the PK LIML fixed effects regression, all regressions instrument with interactions of male and female credit 
choice dummies with household characteristics, survey round dummies, and village dummies. The second set includes the 
interactions with round and village dummies as controls. The PK regression requires homoskedasticity for consistency, but 
allows serial correlation in the errors; under these assumptions, errors within each survey round are i.i.d., making Sargan tests 
valid for the regressions on single-round samples. The Hansen test does not require sphericity, making it consistent for the 
three-round regressions as well, but is weaker. The Difference-Sargan/Hansen test for validity of instrument subsets is based 
on Hansen tests for the first column and Sargan tests for the remainder. Unreported controls are as in previous table. All 




A more standard Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity design might side-step the endogeneity con-
cerns by restricting to households closer to the formal threshold eligibility value of 0.5 acres of land. But 
the more we focus around the threshold the more the mistargeting identified by Morduch comes to the 
fore. Following the advice of Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we start an FRD analysis by plotting the out-
come of interest, household consumption per capita, against the continuous forcing variable in the mod-
el, household landholdings before borrowing. We add Lowess smoothed plots, but separately for the be-
low- and above-threshold subsamples in order to allow for a discontinuity at the half-acre mark. We 
construct this graph first for all villages with a microcredit program; then, in order to narrow the focus 
by gender, for those where only women could borrow and for those where only men could borrow. Fig-
ure 8 is the plot for the female-only villages. The vertical line at log 0.5 ≈ –0.69 marks the threshold. 
The discontinuity in the outcome at the threshold is small compared to the variation in the data. (We ex-
pect some discontinuity by chance since the two Lowess curves are fit to different data.) Imbens and 
Lemieux warn that “if the basic plot does not show any evidence of a discontinuity, there is relatively 
little chance that the more sophisticated analyses will lead to robust and credible estimates with statisti-
cally and substantially significant magnitudes.” Indeed, when we perform a formal FRD analysis using 
2SLS, as suggested by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), we find little evidence of significance 
for the coefficient on microcredit in female-only villages.
22 Varying the sample retained between 1% 
and 50% of available observations, the largest absolute t statistic is 0.86—or 1.27 if PK’s controls, in-
cluding village dummies, are added. Graphical and 2SLS results for male-only villages and for all pro-
gram villages are very similar.
23 
                                                 
22 Hahn, Todd, and Van Der Klaauw show that when the same observations are retained for the outcome and forcing va-
riables, and when the weighting on them is uniform, the FRD estimate can be computed by a 2SLS regression of the outcome 
on x, the forcing variable, instrumenting with the dummy 1{x ≥ c}, where c is the threshold, and controlling for 1{x < c}⋅(x –
 c) and 1{x ≥ c}⋅(x – c). 




Figure 8. Household consumption versus landholdings before borrowing in female-only credit 
program villages, with separate Lowess plots for subsamples above and below half-acre 
 
We replicate the PK regressions for other outcomes too. (See Table 5, which reports results from 
PK’s preferred weighted LIML fixed-effects specification.) We concur in finding little effect on school 
enrollment of girls or boys. The same goes for the value of female-owned assets, which PK may have 
unintentionally studied rather than female non-land assets. On the other hand, our replications differ in 
finding a strong positive association between female (not male) borrowing and female-owned non-land 
assets; a strong negative association between male (but not female) borrowing and female labor supply; 
and no association with male labor supply, where PK found a strong negative effect. We have not inves-
tigated these regressions in the same depth. Certainly, the difficulties with the consumption regressions 
make us cautious about inferring causality from the other ones. And endogenous-causation stories can 
easily explain our results. For instance, Figure 5 suggests that male borrowing is lowest in the poorest 
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In sum, we come away from the PK study with doubts about the magnitude, sign, and direction 
of the reported effects of microcredit. We do not necessarily doubt microcredit itself, but we doubt the 
result that emerged from analyzing the 1991–92 Bangladesh survey. 
Morduch (1998) 
The Study 
Morduch critiques PK and offers new evidence, notably on the connection between credit and the vola-
tility of household consumption and labor supply. Having just critiqued PK, we focus here on replicating 
the novel results in Morduch. 
Morduch’s estimation strategy is simpler and less efficient than PK’s, but analogous. He uses 
sampling weights and nearly the same control sets. The major departure is that rather than instrumenting 
















Log female borrowing from BRAC  0.604 –0.130 0.288 –0.193 –0.229
(2.074)** (0.418) (0.942) (0.945) (1.341)
Log male borrowing from BRAC  0.019 –0.662 –0.237 –0.038 –0.138
(0.050) (1.924)* (0.290) (0.129) (0.727)
Log female borrowing from BRDB 1.024 –0.114 0.125 –0.178 0.088
(1.975)** (0.293) (0.333) (0.615) (0.344)
Log male borrowing from BRDB –0.386 –0.581 –0.233 –0.083 0.065
(1.178) (1.973)** (0.274) (0.417) (0.300)
Log female borrowing from Grameen 0.679 0.129 0.120 –0.105 –0.028
(3.077)*** (0.570) (0.515) (0.737) (0.207)
Log male borrowing from Grameen –0.243 –0.548 –0.273 –0.029 0.150
(1.026) (2.385)** (0.489) (0.183) (0.946)
Observations 1,757 6,537 6,835 1,453 1,573
Log pseudolikelihood –4039.19 –14889.30 –18267.10 –1836.16 –2033.35
Regressions run on household-level data for first column and individual-level for remainder. All use round 1 data 
only and are weighted. PK report regressing school enrollment for ages 5–17, but 5–18 produces a near-perfect 
match with the enrollment variable aggregates in their Table A2. Absolute z statistics clustered by household in 




credit choice. Rather than distinguishing borrowing by gender, he splits by the lending program, leading 
to three variables of interest: dummies for the availability of credit from Grameen, BRAC, and the 
BRDB to at least one gender in a given village. Morduch first performs simple difference-in-difference 
estimates, then adds controls. 
Morduch fails to confirm the PK results on household consumption. His OLS regression with the 
full control set including village effects puts t statistics of –1.48 on Grameen credit access, +0.41 on 
BRAC access, and –1.71 on BRDB access. The hint of negativity is consistent with the results in our 
Table 4, especially considering that Morduch’s program-wise division mixes the coefficients on credit to 
women, which we find to be negative, with those for men, which we cannot distinguish from zero. Mor-
duch, however, finds hopeful evidence that microcredit is affecting the second moment of consumption 
over the three seasonal rounds of the 1991–92 surveys, with t statistics of –1.95, –1.42, and –1.96 in a 
specification with village dummies. Consumption volatility is extremely important for the poor since 
how often children go to bed hungry matters at least as much as whether they are well-fed on average 
(Morduch 1994, 1995). Morduch also finds somewhat weaker evidence (with t statistics of –1.78, –1.35, 
and –1.85) that households with access to credit are actively managing and smoothing their labor in-
come, not just their spending. He asserts, without direct evidence, that it is the ability to smooth income 
over the year which drives smoother within-year consumption.  
The Replication 
Our replication data set matches Morduch’s original quite well, not surprisingly. Still, the rebuilding a 
data set again exposed a few errors in the original, mostly affecting the labor supply variables.
24 In our 
replication, the minor changes turn out to strengthen two of the three negative signs on credit for aver-
age consumption, reinforcing our analysis of PK, but weakening what were arguably marginal results on 
                                                 
24 For instance, Morduch’s construction of the enrollment and labor supply variables omitted individuals reaching school age 




labor supply. (See Table 6, which can be compared directly to Morduch’s Table 13.) 
Table 6. Replication of Morduch regressions with controls 
 
 
The changes also weaken the findings on consumption volatility, reducing the t statistics on 
Grameen and BRDB credit from –1.95 and –1.96 in the original to –1.46 and –1.54 (right pane of Table 
6). This result, however, still appears to be more than noise, though we caution against interpreting it as 
evidence of causation from credit to volatility. Table 7 shows why: it replicates Morduch’s difference-
in-difference analysis (without controls) of the relationship between credit availability and the variance 
of log household per-capita consumption over the three seasons, excluding mistargeted households. The 
Grameen BRAC BRDB Grameen BRAC BRDB Grameen BRAC BRDB
–0.042 –0.026 –0.078 –0.062 –0.031 –0.065 –0.097 0.024 –0.144
(0.89) (0.56) (1.92)* (1.16) (0.63) (1.60) (1.54) (0.42) (2.02)**
–0.008 –0.005 –0.010 –0.013 –0.006 –0.009 –0.035 –0.045 –0.038
(0.71) (0.46) (0.89) (1.01) (0.50) (0.85) (1.46) (1.19) (1.54)
0.056 –0.075 0.020 0.091 –0.068 0.017 –0.068 –0.139 0.119
(1.21) (1.52) (0.43) (1.36) (1.14) (0.38) (0.70) (1.37) (1.12)
–0.024 0.008 –0.006 –0.072 –0.006 –0.014 –0.046 –0.081 –0.031
(0.83) (0.30) (0.21) (2.09)** (0.21) (0.50) (0.81) (1.12) (0.56)
16.23 3.99 10.30 10.11 –6.50 5.67 –9.23 –9.91 9.90
(2.19)** (0.49) (1.35) (0.95) (0.59) (0.71) (0.62) (0.71) (0.73)
1.78 –19.49 –0.74 13.69 5.06 8.91 –9.25 –17.39 12.10
(0.12) (1.50) (0.06) (0.85) (0.42) (0.97) (0.71) (1.23) (0.80)
0.88 –2.12 –5.55 7.18 7.14 –2.12 –1.35 –2.05 –12.23
(0.14) (0.34) (0.90) (0.95) (1.00) (0.35) (0.13) (0.19) (1.34)
–5.59 –2.24 –15.85 –12.53 –11.14 –20.78 2.57 5.51 –0.81
(0.84) (0.33) (2.32)** (1.93)* (1.77)* (3.59)*** (0.23) (0.56) (0.08)
Variance of per adult log 
labor
Unit of observation is the household for the top half of the table and the individual for bottom half. All regressions are 
OLS, except for the male and female labor hours ones, which are Tobit. All regressions are weighted. Absolute t 
statistics robust to intra-household correlation in parenthesis. *significant at 10%. **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%.
% females in school (age 
5–17)
Adult female labor hours 
in past month
Adult male labor hours in 
past month
% males in school (age 
5–17)
Target households, 
controlling for household & 
village characteristics
All households, controlling 
for household characteristics 
and village fixed effects
Target households, 
controlling for household 
characteristics
Log labor per adult in 
past month
Log consumption/capita
Variance of log 




estimates in the bottom right of the table are strongly negative. But they are driven not by lower volatili-
ty in treatment households but higher volatility in ineligible households in program villages. Concretely, 
five of the eight core numbers in the upper left are about the same, with the three for non-target house-
holds in Grameen, BRAC, and BRDB villages the odd ones out. To interpret the difference-in-difference 
as impact measures, we must believe that the households with access to credit would, lacking that 
access, have experienced the same volatility as their affluent neighbors, and well more than their target 
brethren in non-program villages. The fact that volatility for these households dropped to about the level 
experienced by target and non-target households in non-program villages (about 0.6–0.7) would then 
have to be a coincidence. A competing and arguably more parsimonious explanation is that non-target 
households in villages where credit programs had chosen to operate are systematically different both 
from target households in those villages and from all households in villages where the programs did not 
operate. That would fit with our findings above about the non-excludability of credit choice–village 
dummy interactions. Buttressing this interpretation is the fact that the volatility comes mainly from rare 
but large expenditures on land, home improvement, and social and religious ceremonies, perhaps includ-
ing dowry, which for some reason are reportedly rarer among the non-target households in the five con-
trol villages than among non-target (and non-borrowing) households in program villages. Control villag-
es were home to 45 of the sample’s 256 non-target, non-borrowing households yet account for only one 
of the 25 largest individual purchases reported in this class (See Table 8.) Fundamentally, the volatility 








Table 8. Top 25 individual expenditures all non-target, non-borrowing households, all 1991–92 
survey rounds 
 
Grameen BRAC BRDB Control Grameen BRAC BRDB
Under 0.5 acre 0.061 0.062 0.055 0.069 –0.008 –0.007 –0.013
(1.00) (0.85) (1.52)
Over 0.5 acre 0.112 0.131 0.117 0.069 0.043 0.062 0.048
(1.86)* (1.70)* (2.15)**
Difference –0.052 –0.069 –0.062 –0.000 –0.05 –0.07 –0.06
(2.41)** (1.96)* (2.98)*** (0.03) (2.08)** (1.84)* (2.55)**
Difference
Absolute t statistics robust to intra-household correlation in parenthesis. *significant at 











(acres) Upazilla District Division
Home Improvent 130,000  3 Grameen 281                1.3         Sonargaon Narayanganj Dhaka
Land/Property Purchase 125,000  1B R A C 1 , 7 3 5             6.5         Habiganj Sadar Habiganj Sylhet
Miscellaneous 72,000     2B R D B 1 9 4                57.5       Birganj Dinajpur Rajshahi
Land/Property Purchase 65,000     1 Grameen 438                13.3       Sreepur Gazipur Dhaka
Land/Property Purchase 53,000     3B R A C 8 6                 1.5         Sreebardi Sherpur Dhaka
Land/Property Purchase 53,000     3B R D B 1 1 6                2.1         Fakirhat Bagerhat Khulna
Home Improvent 50,000     3 Grameen 235                3.1         Sonargaon Narayanganj Dhaka
Home Improvent 50,000     2 Grameen 281                1.3         Sonargaon Narayanganj Dhaka
Home Improvent 50,000     1B R A C 6 6 6                1.4         Rangpur Sadar Rangpur Rajshahi
Public Transport 45,000     2B R A C 1 6 8                1.3         Kalaroa Satkhira Khulna
Home Improvent 40,000     2 Grameen 235                3.1         Sonargaon Narayanganj Dhaka
Servants Wage 37,000     1B R D B 6 1 4                0.9         Muktagachha Mymensingh Dhaka
Land/Property Purchase 35,000     2B R D B 6 1 4                0.9         Muktagachha Mymensingh Dhaka
Social/Religious Ceremony 35,000     2B R A C 1 8 9                6.8         Habiganj Sadar Habiganj Sylhet
Medicine 35,000     2B R D B 1 4 2                2.1         Fakirhat Bagerhat Khulna
Home Improvent 30,000     2 Grameen 103                2.4         Sakhipur Tangail Dhaka
Servant's Wages 28,000     1B R A C 2 5 4                1.2         Kalaroa Satkhira Khulna
Land/Property Purchase 27,000     2B R A C 1 2 3                1.7         Sreebardi Sherpur Dhaka
Land/Property Purchase 26,000     2 Grameen 121                6.0         Raiganj Sirajganj Rajshahi
Marriage/Birth/Death 25,000     2B R D B 6 6                 3.1         Shibganj Bogra Rajshahi
Ceremony 25,000     1 Grameen 381                5.0         Jaldhaka Nilphamari Rajshahi
Land/Property Purchase 24,000     2N o n e 1 3 2                0.9         Jhenaidah Sadar Jhenaidah Khulna
Servant's Wages 24,000     1B R A C 2 8 8                1.5         Manikganj Sadar Manikganj Dhaka
Land/Property Purchase 24,000     3B R D B 1 6 2                8.3         Birganj Dinajpur Rajshahi
Land/Property Purchase 24,000     3B R D B 6 6                 3.1         Shibganj Bogra Rajshahi





Overall, although we share the puzzlement in Morduch over the inability to replicate PK’s posi-
tive findings for the effects of microcredit on the level of household consumption, we do not find power-
ful evidence for effects on its variability either.
25 Because Morduch’s regression are exactly identified, 
not overidentified like PK’s, we cannot apply the Hansen J test. But the same doubts about the validity 
of the three implicit instruments—availability of credit from each of the programs studied—pertain. 
Khandker (2005) 
The Study 
In 1999, surveyors in Bangladesh sought to revisit the 1,769 households that persisted through all three 
1991–92 data collection rounds. For 1,638, they found the original household or one or more successors, 
yielding an attrition rate of just 7.4%. Of the original households, 237 households had split, yielding 546 
new ones. Confronted with the conceptually complex problems of attrition and dissolution of the unit of 
observation, Khandker’s response is straightforward: amalgamate split households for purposes of anal-
ysis and drop attritors from all rounds.  
The potential for endogenous attrition raises worries about bias. On the one hand, Thomas, Fran-
kenberg, and Smith (2001) argue from Indonesian household survey data that attritors who move long 
distances differ statistically from those they leave behind, and are worth trying to follow. On the other, 
in tests on longitudinal household data from Bolivia, Kenya, and South Africa, Alderman et al. (2001) 
find little bias in practice. Khandker reports formally testing, in an uncirculated paper by Khandker and 
Pitt, for attrition and amalgamation biases and finding that both issues are largely ignorable. 
As Khandker notes, the availability of panel data raises the hope of eliminating one potential 
source of bias in the PK and Morduch cross-section analyses, namely that unobserved but fixed house-
hold and individual characteristics simultaneously affect microcredit borrowing and outcomes of inter-
                                                 
25 PK-style LIML FE regressions for household consumption variability find no effect for male borrowing but a positive ef-




est. In particular, differencing can respond to the concern that village effects are not “fixed” within vil-
lages—to the extent that they are fixed over time, which is plausibly more true. Khandker explicitly dis-
tinguishes the panel approach he takes from PK’s quasi-experimental design. Indeed, any claims for an 
exogenous component in the allocation of credit weakened over the 1990s. By 1999, every study village 
had access to microcredit, at least for women, so variation in the choice variables declined; and, as 
Khandker documents, formal mistargeting of credit to above-half-acre households actually increased.  
Khandker points out, however, that individual- and village-level effects may not be fixed, and 
that other sources of endogeneity may remain, so he starts with 2SLS regressions that instrument like 
ours with interaction terms between choice dummies and the   variables. Khandker treats the 1991–92 
data as a single time period. Adding the 1999 data and including individual fixed effects gives a cross-
section in differences. Reflecting the new time dimension, the regressions feature four credit variables: 
“current” female and male borrowing (i.e., cumulative borrowing since the first survey rounds) and 
“past” female and male borrowing (i.e., cumulative borrowing between late 1986 and 1991, as in PK).
26 
And whereas in our 2SLS regressions (above) we interacted with the female and male choice dummies 
for instruments, Khandker interacts with a pair of dummies differentiated along the time dimension: one 
for whether household members of either gender could borrow in 1991–92, and the same for 1999.
27 
Khandker studies three outcomes: household food consumption, non-food consumption, and total 
consumption, all in inflation-adjusted taka per year. The control set is nearly identical to that in PK’s 
non–fixed effects specifications, including time-varying village-level variables. Unlike PK, Khandker 
includes households owning more than 5 acres. The 1991–92 sampling weights are used throughout. 
                                                 
26 These too formally enter in differences, but in practice they can also be seen as entering undifferenced. The value for 
twice-lagged cumulative borrowing is not observed—it would cover a period in the first half of the 1980s, it is assumed to be 
zero, perhaps not unreasonably, since microcredit was less common then. The lagged difference of cumulative borrowing is 
then just the lagged level. And, conditioning on this past level, regressing on the current difference is tantamount to regress-
ing on the current level. 
27 By 1999, all villages had credit programs, so the later dummy merely indicates whether households are eligible. Khandker 




Khandker also performs OLS regressions in parallel with the 2SLS ones. A Wu-Hausman test fails to 
reject the hypothesis that the results from the two estimators differ, so he reports only OLS. 
Khandker then builds on the foundation of his core OLS regressions. First, he adds average bor-
rowing in a village as a regressor in order to test for spill-over effects, which he finds for women’s bor-
rowing. Then he feeds the results on the benefits of female borrowing for households and villages into a 
retroactive simulation to study the effects of microcredit on households by poverty level. Here, he dis-
tinguishes between the “moderately” and “extremely poor.”
28 Starting from observed consumption and 
borrowing levels, he calculates that in aggregate microcredit reduced the moderate poverty rate by 1.0 
percentage point per year, equivalent to 40% of the total decline in Bangladesh over the 1990s; and ex-
treme poverty by 1.3 percentage points a year. This extreme-moderate differential arises mainly from the 
fact that different households borrowed different amounts. It does not arise from an econometric esti-
mate that allows separate impact elasticities for the two groups. Nor does it come from the fact that the 
elasticities that are estimated imply different marginal effects at different consumption and borrowing 
levels, because Khandker assumes a fixed average impact for the simulation. 
Buried in the shift to the panel set-up are at least two issues relating to the recurring theme of 
whether there is a credible source of exogenous variation in credit. First, the shift to a panel estimator 
only reduces the need for an exogenous source of variation in borrowing to the extent that endogeneity 
of all types is removed by differencing. Khandker’s 2SLS regressions are premised on the assumption 
that the particular family of interaction terms used as instruments embodies such variation—and no 
more. But this assumption is not grounded in economic reasoning: the Khandker paper distances itself 
from any claim to quasi-experimental variation. And, as in all the papers replicated here, the assumption 
is not tested. 
                                                 
28 Khandker (1998, p. 55) defines moderate poverty as household consumption below 5,270 taka/person/year and extreme 




The second issue relates to time-varying effects. In PK’s cross-section analysis, using 14 village-
level controls is less conservative than entering 86 village dummies, which is why PK prefer the latter. 
Dummies express our ignorance about the many village-level factors that affect both credit and out-
comes. As PK explain: “These attributes include prices, infrastructure, village attitudes, and the nature 
of the environment, including climate and propensity to natural disaster. For example, the proximity of 
villages to urban areas may influence the demand for credit to undertake small-scale activities but may 
also affect household behavior by altering attitudes.” Yet when we move from the cross-section to the 
time series as the locus of identification, we meet a paradox: controlling for a handful of concrete but 
time-varying village controls is more conservative than using a much larger set of village fixed effects. 
In the case at hand, time-varying village variables such as the rice price usefully remain in the model 
after differencing. Village fixed effects disappear. The core problem is that few if any of the factors 
rightly cited by PK in arguing for modeling with village fixed effects are in fact fixed. Sadly, climate 
changes. Practical proximity to cities depends on road quality. 
There is a way out of the paradox: where entering village dummies is conservative in the PK es-
timation set-up, entering them in the Khandker set-up after other variables are differenced is the con-
servative analog. In the model, this would allow all unknown village-level factors to vary in impact over 
the 1990s. In fact, Khandker essentially does this in the first stage of his 2SLS regressions since the in-
strument sets include interactions with village dummies. The question is whether it is proper to exclude 
village dummies from the second stage. 
The Replication 
In replicating Khandker, we run into a problem opposite that we had with PK: our summary statistics for 
key variables do not match the original nearly so precisely (see Table 9) but we easily replicate the pat-




household consumption (first column of Table 10).
29 A 2SLS regression replicating the one Khandker 
describes but does not report produces even stronger results (column 3 of Table 10). We then proceed to 
check some of the methodological issues just raised. First, we introduce village dummy controls after 
differencing (columns 2 and 4). This substantially weakens the results for female credit, but perhaps 
does not destroy them. In 2SLS at least, the coefficient on women’s past loans becomes very large and 
remains statistically strong (column 4). 
But here we encounter a new concern: the first Hansen test is clearly rejecting the hypothesis that 
the Khandker instrument set is valid. Thus the fact that the OLS results fit with the 2SLS ones, the crux 
of Khandker’s argument, is not so reassuring. The premise of the Wu-Hausman test, that 2SLS is consis-
tent, appears violated. So, much as with PK (Table 4), we enter the instruments based on village dum-
mies as controls (final two columns). Their joint significance is clear, and the 2SLS no-FE regression 
(column 5) does better on the Hansen test. On the other hand, the 2SLS FE regression (column 6) pro-
duces a perfect Hansen p value of 1.000, a sure and unsurprising sign that overinstrumentation is wea-
kening the test (Roodman 2009a). As with the PK replication, this step does not change the pattern of 
signs much; but nor does it leave us with great confidence in the instrumentation strategy. And the point 
estimate for the significant coefficient in the last regression, 0.317 on past women’s loans, is ten times 
larger than that from OLS. Plugging this number into Khandker’s simulation might lead to the estimate 
that microcredit accounted for more than 100% of the poverty reduction in Bangladesh in the 1990s. 
 
                                                 
29 Our coefficients of 0.026 and 0.034 on current and past women’s borrowing are much larger than Khandker’s 0.009 and 















3,472     797       2,787    720      
(6,829) (3,678,4) (6,659) (3,598)
5,853     1,583    5,442    1,407   
(8,038) (4,974) (7,654) (4,562)
3,910     3,791    5,635    4,452    3,993    3,819    5,693    4,549   
(1,586) (1,678) (3,666) (2,555) (1,644) (1,724) (3,615) (2,708)
3,051     2,966    3,705    3,237    3,075    2,990    3,662    3,258   
(795) (879) (1,123) (987) (795) (895) (1,079) (992)
859       825       1,931    1,215    919       829       2,031    1,291   
(1,102) (1,061) (3,086) (1,958) (1,187) (1,091) (3,031) (2,115)
Obervations 824       535       279       1,638    824       541       273       1,638   
1999
2,483     1,088    2,150    1,149   
(9,013) (5,791) (7,958) (5,898)
11,348   5,581    11,795   6,266   
(17,592) (13,392) (18,141) (14,472)
5,264     4,504    7,214    5,810    4,977    4,465    7,059    5,431   
(3,580) (2,664) (5,789) (4,503) (3,263) (2,704) (5,526) (4,034)
3,550     3,305    4,374    3,753    3,284    3,175    3,971    3,446   
(1,335) (1,506) (2,189) (1,688) (1,214) (1,377) (2,018) (1,533)
1,714     1,198    2,840    2,057    1,693    1,290    3,088    1,985   
(2,848) (1,579) (4,571) (3,575) (2,593) (1,687) (4,591) (3,199)
Obervations 1,104     292       242       1,638    1,123    288       227       1,638   
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Non-food expenditure/capita 
(taka per year) 
Cumulative borrowing by 
men (taka) 
Cumulative borrowing by 
women (taka) 
Total expenditure/capita 
(taka per year) 
Non-food expenditure/capita 
(taka per year) 
Food expenditure/capita 




(taka per year) 
New data set
Cumulative borrowing by 
men (taka) 
Cumulative borrowing by 
women (taka) 
Total expenditure/capita 
(taka per year) 




Table 10. Estimates of the impact of microcredit on household (HH) consumption, following 
Khandker 
 
Overall, these findings reduce our confidence that Khandker’s results reflect causality from cre-
dit to household consumption. Since we doubt the OLS foundation of the Khandker paper, we also doubt 
that which is built upon it, in particular the claim that microcredit has disproportionately helped ex-
tremely poor people. Fundamentally, the move to the panel framework does not seem to compensate for 
the lack of clearly exogenous variation in the use of microcredit. 
Conclusion 
Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Khandker (2005) prominently reinforced three broad ideas about micro-
credit: that it is effective in reducing poverty generally, that this is especially so when women do the 
borrowing, and that the extremely poor benefit most. Morduch (1998) disseminated the idea that micro-
credit helps families smooth their expenditures, lessening the pinch of hunger and need in lean times. In 
No FE FE No FE FE No FE FE
Log women's current loans 0.026 0.017 0.046 0.007 –0.027 –0.001
(2.228)** (1.580) (1.818)* (0.218) (0.378) (0.019)
Log women's past loans 0.034 0.020 0.107 0.135 0.348 0.317
(2.324)** (1.257) (3.372)*** (2.700)*** (2.310)** (3.522)***
Log men's current loans 0.036 0.001 0.145 0.078 0.057 0.105
(1.824)* (0.029) (2.358)** (1.280) (0.397) (0.804)
Log men's past loans 0.004 –0.024 0.026 –0.052 0.008 –0.092
(0.177) (1.057) (0.520) (0.703) (0.057) (0.934)
Interaction terms using village dummies
(F test p value) 0.000 0.000
Observations 1,638       1,638 1,638 1,638 1,638 1,638
Hansen J test (p value) 0.000 0.112 0.288 1.000
All regressions run in differences except that fixed-effect (FE) regressions include village dummy controls 
undifferenced. All 2SLS regressions instrument with lagged and current interactions of the credit choice 
dummy with village dummies and (unreported) controls. Final pair includes interaction terms involving village 
dummies as controls. "Current loans" is cumulative borrowing over the last 6–7-year period; "past loans" is 
that for the previous period and is set to 0 for 1991–92. Controls are: sex, age, and education level of 
household head; whether parents, brothers, and sisters of household head or spouse own land (for 1991–92) 
or own at least 0.5 acres (1999); availability of co-education; and, for non-FE regressions, prices of rice, wheat 
flour, mustard oil, hen's eggs, milk, and potatoes, as well as male and female wage levels. Absolute t statistics 
robust to heteroskadasticity in parenthesis. *significant at 10%. **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%.




our view, nothing in the present paper contradicts those ideas. We assert, however, that decisive statis-
tical evidence in favor of them is absent from these studies and extraordinarily scarce in the literature as 
a whole. The principle difficulties for studying the effects of microfinance have been a lack of clean qu-
asi-experiments and an absence until recently of randomized trials. 
Our short list of exceptions includes Coleman (1999, 2006), Fernald et al. (2008), Banerjee et al 
(2009), and Karlan and Zinman (2009 and forthcoming). Coleman performs an experiment in the form 
of random and unannounced delays in implementing a credit program in some villages in Northeast 
Thailand. He finds measurable benefits for relatively affluent and well-connected villagers. Fernald et 
al., as well as Karlan and Zinman (forthcoming), study a cash loan business in South Africa, not unlike a 
payday lender in the United States, which agreed to randomly relax its computerized risk assessment 
rules for marginal candidates. Fernald et al. find that loans increase psychological stress among women, 
but not men. But Karlan and Zinman find benefits across genders and a variety of outcomes, including 
for household consumption. Notably, the South African loans are perhaps not “microcredit” as usually 
conceived: they are high-cost consumer finance and the key mechanism may have been that the loans let 
people obtain jobs that required them to pay for training up-front, whereas poor people targeted by mi-
crocredit typically have little hope of such employment (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). Karlan and Zinman 
(2009) take a similar method to the Philippines, with a focus there on traditional microcredit for small 
business investment. Profits rise, but largely for men and particularly for men with higher incomes. 
Moreover, the increases in profits appear to arise from business contractions that yielded smaller, lower-
cost (and more profitable) enterprises. Banerjee et al., (2009) run a traditional randomized trial of mi-
crocredit in urban India. After a year, they report a mix of economic results but no strong average im-
pacts; measured impacts on health, education, and women’s empowerment were negligible. As we write, 




serting large, sustained impacts of microcredit. 
At least three more randomized controlled trials of microfinance are underway or in prospect in 
Mexico, Morocco, and Peru. The sudden swell of randomized trials 30 years after the birth of microcre-
dit of course reflects a broader trend in the social sciences. As such, it also leads to a broader question, 
about the value of non-randomized studies. Our prior is that exclusive reliance on one type of study is 
not optimal. But the present analysis suggests that for non-randomized studies to contribute to the study 
of causation in social systems where endogeneity is pervasive, the quality of the natural experiments 
must be very high. And it must be demonstrated. We also believe that longitudinal surveys like the ones 
in Bangladesh are worthwhile even when they fail to enlighten us about the impacts of outside interven-
tions. In the Lowess plots in this paper, for instance, one can glimpse a trove of information about how 
poor households manage money and use financial services. Because of the eagerness to study important 
questions of impact, this trove remains substantially unexplored. 
If our conclusions stand the test of time, they will also raise a question about how researchers 
and practitioners can more easily determine the robustness of important findings. One partial solution is 
for more journals to encourage replication studies like this one, for example by requiring authors to 
share data and code (Hamermesh 2007). Another step is to develop norms for graphically demonstrating 
identifying assumptions in non-experimental studies of causal mechanisms. More can be done to im-
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Appendix. Testing the estimation software on a simulated dataset 
Pitt’s (1999) reply to Morduch (1999) includes Stata command files that simulate data sets illustrating various 
aspects of the estimation problem as well as the consistency of the 2SLS analog of the PK estimator. Because 
we cannot explain the contradiction between PK’s headline results and our replication, we report here on a set 
of simulations performed with code adapted from Pitt. We borrow from his command file “sim7.do,” which is 
the most elaborate simulation that embodies most of the key features of the PK model.
31 
The simulated data sets can be described as follows. The outcome, female borrowing, and male borrow-
ing equations contain correlated village-level fixed effects, according to: 
   ,   ,    
 
~i.i.d.   , 
1 √0.1  √0.1
√0.1 1  0 . 5
 √0.1  0.5 1
   
At the household level, idiosyncratic errors are structured similarly and combine with the village effects for 
overall error terms: 
   ,   ,    
 
~i.i.d.   , 
1 √0.5 √0.5
√0.5 10 . 5
√0.5 0.5 1
  , 
             
             
             
Exogenous regressors are generated using the uniform distribution on the unit interval,   0,1 : 
  ,   ,   ~i.i.d.  0,1  
         0 . 5  
         0 . 5  
       0.7   
                                                 
31 Pitt’s later simulations illustrate consistency of the LIML estimator in the face of various deviations from the basic assumptions, 




Female credit programs are more common than male ones: 
    1        1    
    1      0   
And households owning less than half an acre are eligible: 
  1         0.5  
Using a credit censoring level of   0 , and following the nomenclature in (1), the system of equations is:  
         
         
  
   2      3              1     if     1  
  
        2      2         1     if     1  
    1      
      ·   
  
    1    
       ·   
   
    2      2              1.5    0 . 5          
where the coefficients on    and    are of primary interest. 
Table 11 characterizes the distributions of the coefficients estimates using three different estimators: 
WESML-LIML-FE; the analogous 2SLS estimator with a large set of interaction terms, as in (2); and exactly 
identified 2SLS, which instruments only with    and   . The main point is in the first row: our implementation 
of PK’s LIML estimator clearly works correctly in this case. The analogous 2SLS estimates (second row) are 
also reasonable, but less efficient and, as the last row suggests, somewhat upward-biased by overfitting in the 




Table 11. Estimated coefficients on    and   , 100 draws 
 
Estimator Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
WESML-LIML-FE 1.500 0.040 0.497 0.055
2SLS 1.587 0.122 0.594 0.172
2SLS, instrumenting with c f,c m only 1.527 0.166 0.479 0.239
y f (true value = 1.5) y m (true value = 0.5)